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Epigraph, Free Will in Action: A philosophy
professor of my acquaintance who smoked
was arguing with someone in a bar in favor of
free will. She self-consciously ground out her
cigarette and threw the rest of the pack away.
(She never smoked again.) “THAT'S free will,”
she practically screamed.Theworld, led by the United States, is hell bent on establishing the absence of choice in addiction, as expressed by
the deﬁning statement that addiction is a “chronic relapsing brain disease” (my emphasis). The ﬁgure most asso-
ciated with this model, the director of the American National Institute on Drug Abuse, Nora Volkow, claims that
addiction vitiates freewill through its effects on the brain. In reality,while by nomeans a simple task, people reg-
ularly quit their substance addictions, often by moderating their consumption, usually through mindfulness-
mediated processes (Peele, 2007).
Ironically, the brain diseasemodel's ascendance in theU.S. correspondswith epidemic rises in opiate addiction, both
painkillers (Brady et al., 2016) and heroin (CDC, n.d.), aswell as heroin, painkiller, and tranquilizer poisoning deaths
(Rudd et al., 2016). More to the point, the conceptual and treatment goal of eliminating choice in addiction and re-
covery is not only futile, but iatrogenic. Indeed, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism's epidemio-
logical surveys, while ﬁnding natural recovery for both drug and alcohol disorders to be typical, has found a decline
in natural recovery rates (Dawson et al., 2005) and a sharp increase in AUDs (Grant et al., 2015).
© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Abuse, the best-known representative of the model of addiction as a
chronic brain disease (see Nature, 2014) declared “Addiction as aen access article under the CC BY-NCdisease of free will” (Volkow, 2015) for which we as a society need
to:
understand that addiction is not just a disease of the brain, but
one in which the circuits that enable us to exert free will no lon-
ger function as they should. Drugs disrupt these circuits. The-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Percent days of any drinking during the course of treatment.
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longer a choice to take the drug.
The Surgeon General's ﬁrst report on smoking (Department of Health,
Education, andWelfare, 1964), “Smoking and Health,” deﬁnitively linked
smoking to cancer, beginning a cultural process over the followingdecades
in which over half of smokers quit. But a substantial minority didn't quit.
TheDepartment ofHealth andHumanServices (2002)published a vol-
umeentitled, “ThoseWhoContinue to Smoke.”The investigators imagined
those who continued to be addicted as being handicapped in some way.
The results were perplexing: “In summary, these trends do not suggest
that the population of smokerswho remains ismore addicted, more resis-
tant to cessationmessages, less likely to attempt cessation, or increasingly
composed of those with limited activities or poor mental health” (p. 143).
One particularly interesting and surprising ﬁnding in the mono-
graph was an interaction between age and degree of dependence in
smoking cessation: more dependent younger smokers were less likely
to quit than less dependent ones; more dependent older smokers
were more likely to do so. Jettisoning all assumptions about addiction,
a sensible deduction would be that older heavier smokers, sensing
their mortality and wanting to delay death, which they knew was
more likely to ensue given the severity of their habit, were more moti-
vated to quit and more often did so.
The whole point in smoking cessation efforts was to recognize
smoking as addictive, which is now universally accepted (although
the 1964 Surgeon General's report explicitly rejected the idea; cf.
Peele, 2010). Yet these results confound our notion of addiction, and
certainly the ironclad, neuroscientiﬁc, brain disease model of it.
Despite the consensus around smoking's addictiveness, perhaps these
results are limited to nicotine/smoking. No, they are not. A contributor to
this issue, Gene Heyman (2013), analyzed the most recent NESARC data
according to a timeline of likelihood of quitting a drug dependence:
Although varied [according to the speciﬁc substance], the remission
results were orderly. An exponential growth curve closely approxi-
mated the cumulative frequency of remitting for different drugs
and different ethnic/racial groups. Thus, each year a constant pro-
portion of those still addicted remitted, independent of the number
of years since the onset of dependence.
In summary, addiction as the idea that people are irresistibly, inexora-
bly, irreversibly stuck in a drug dependence so that no effort ofwill can ex-
tricate them is wrong, as proved by research that directly tests this belief.
Yet Volkow has no fear of being contradicted while claiming the counter-
factual assertion and, moreover, cloaking it with the mantle of science.
1. Reductionism, harm reduction, natural remission
People readily substitute “scientism” for science: that is, being awed
by seemingly scientiﬁc activity in place of the actual science of testing
hypotheses with data.
TheNewYork Times offer oneofmany examples of a clinician coming
to grips with harm reduction, or the idea that total abstinence is not the
only beneﬁcial outcome.
Can Nicotine Be Good for You?My new patient explained that in her
sophomore year at college she had started smoking. The effect, she
said, was like “a key that ﬁt perfectly into a lock.” Her brain felt clearer,
her thoughts were more coherent, her mood and energy improved.
Not wanting to damage her lungs, she soon switched over to nicotine
gumandhadbeen taking the sameamount of it forwell over a decade.
(my emphasis) She asked me what I thought of her use of the drug.
The short answer was that I didn't know what to make of it.
Ultimately, this clinician could only justify allowing her client to per-
sist in this less harmful form of addiction by concluding that her addic-
tion was “in her brain.”But as I thought about our conversation later, I found her image of a
key in a lock particularly striking; it was the very same one that psy-
chiatrists and neurophysiologists use to describe the interactions in
the brain between neurotransmitters and their receptors. And in
fact, neurons do have receptors into which nicotine neatly ﬁts, mim-
icking the actions of the brain's own molecules. (Fels, 2016)
What if thewriter were forced to confront the best data, which shows
that people regularly overcome substance addictions, including smoking,
even after they are notable for failing to do so for years, evendecades? She
seemingly wouldn't be able to gather sufﬁcient moral commitment to
approve of continuing the addiction in a less harmful form. Her justiﬁca-
tion for proceeding on this basis is, inmywording, “Thiswoman can't quit
her addiction. It's the neurochemical key to her brain.”
But what about all of those people who do quit addictions? At some
point in my presentations, I ask the audience, “Have any of you quit a
smoking addiction?” A third to a half raise their hands. Virtually none
of the people in these exercises relies on the nicotine replacement ther-
apy (NRT) used by this woman. This demonstration doesn't prove that
this woman can quit chewing nicotine gum. But it is important to estab-
lish scientiﬁcally accurate parameters for this possibility.
Using this Times case in aworkshop, I said: “Well, of course, this ther-
apist did a brain scan to show that this particular woman has a particu-
lar neurochemical reaction proving nicotine has the key to her brain.”No
she (the therapist) didn't. She wouldn't know how. Nobody does. There
is no such neurochemical key. Nor can a brain scan show that people are
able, or on the verge, of quitting or cutting back their addiction. There is
some experiential conﬁguration that creates both the addiction and
change that can't be broken down into neurochemical, cognitive, and
situational components. The residue strongly resembles what might
be called free will (Peele and Thompson, 2015).
Therapy is often directed to lowering a person like this woman's
anxiety levels and to ﬁguring out her experiential and situational
keys—called addictive cues or triggers—for the purpose of assisting her
to abstain. But it's the woman's right to refuse to participate in this pro-
cess, and our obligation to accept her choice. What is wrong, and im-
moral, is to tell the woman that such change isn't possible. This
phenomenon ofmislabeling continued addiction as a biological impera-
tive has been imbedded in harm reduction by Dole and Nyswander
(1967), the developers of methadone maintenance, through their
claim that former heroin users absolutely require substitute narcotics
such as methadone or buprenorphine because they suffer from a per-
manent “metabolic disease.”
But they don't. Maybe peoplewant that substitute (andwho is to say
this “want” is not a “need”), either currently, for a long time, or forever.
It's their right to choose, without added guilt laid on by therapists or
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gay lifestyles on the grounds that people's sexuality is genetically deter-
mined. Would such defenders of gay rights then arrest people who
chose a same-sex mate but who were proved not to have a gay gene
(one that does not exist)? Of course, when confronted with bisexuality,
such well-meaning advocates for tolerance based on biological impera-
tives are left hemming and hawing.Fig. 3.Weekly craving measure during the course of treatment.2. The strange (according to whom?) workings of the human mind
In the area of harm reduction, two landmark studies show that an
outcome once claimed by both Alcoholics Anonymous and the journal
Science (Pendery et al., 1982) to be nigh on impossible occurs
regularly—as I, along with another contributor to this volume, Nick
Heather, have noted for three decades (Heather and Robertson, 1981;
Peele, 1983, 1987b, 2013). Neither study explicitly addresses harm re-
duction, or what was then called controlled drinking. Yet each offers
fundamental insight into its natural occurrence.
A treatment study with alcohol-dependent subjects conducted by the
most prestigious pharmacologically-based research center in the United
States, at the University of Pennsylvania as led by Charles O′Brien,
attempted to establish the beneﬁts of “pharmacogenetic matching” in
the case of Naltrexone treatment (NTX) for alcoholism (Oslin et al.,
2015). That is, NTX results in alcoholism treatment were often scattered,
and the investigators surmised that variants (alleles) of an opioid receptor
gene might account for the differences.
But no such matching appeared. In fact, placebo outcomes for re-
duced drinking were virtually identical to those created by NTX in two
opioid receptor allele conditions over an experimental period of
12weeks—remarkably so, as shown in Figs. 1,2. For craving assessments
(Fig. 3), the lowest measurement occurred for a placebo group by the
end of the trial. This is not to say that beneﬁts in reduced drinking
weren't noted. Indeed, they were distinct and across-the-board. More-
over, these beneﬁts appeared almost instantly, at the very outset of
the trial.
These results strongly resemble those from the landmark clinical
trial of psychotherapy for alcoholism treatment—Project MATCH. In
fact, the massive MATCH operation produced no usable results in re
matching, to which the director of the NIAAA, Enoch Gordis, responded
by claiming: “The good news is that treatment works. All three treat-
ments evaluated in Project MATCH produced excellent overall
outcomes.”
In order to make such a statement, however, Gordis and MATCH in-
vestigators had to overlook the relative paucity of abstinence by sub-
jects (who were highly selected to be socially stable and not burdened
with mental illness or criminal problems), and instead to emphasizeFig. 2. Drinks per drinking day during the course of treatment.harm reduction outcomes: “During the year after treatment, 1 in 4 cli-
ents remained continuously abstinent on average, and an additional 1
in 10 used alcoholmoderately andwithout problems. The remaining cli-
ents, as a group, showed substantial improvement, abstaining on 3 days
out of 4 and reducing their overall alcohol consumption by 87%, on av-
erage. Alcohol-related problems also decreased by 60%” (Miller et al.,
2001).
This was not the ﬁnal word on MATCH, however. As I summarized
the MATCH results, (Peele, 1997), combined with the NIAAA's NLAES
project: “(1) minimal or no treatment produces outcomes that are
equal to/better than those from longer/standard treatments; (2) patient
traits and initiative are far more important than treatment type or in-
tensity for recovery; (3) reduced drinking is themost common outcome
for alcohol-dependent individuals.” Some years later Cutler and
Fishbain (2005) re-analyzed the MATCH data, with the conclusions:
“Overall, a median of only 3% of the drinking outcome at follow-up
could be attributed to treatment. However this effect appeared to be
present at week one before most of the treatment had been delivered.”
(emphasis added).
As with the NTX/genetics trial, the main deduction to be taken from
Project MATCH is that something identiﬁable as treatment has little to
do with recovery, relative to the person's own ability to come to grips
with and to eliminate their addiction.
3. What if you remove choice from people?
The goal of the brain disease model of addiction is to remove any
idea of the drinker or drug user as an active participant in their recovery,
as someone capable of enacting an intention to quit in line with their
values (see Peele, 1987a). Instead, this model sees humans as biological
automatons whomust rely on—can only be passive recipients of—some
modernmedical miracle, a la NTX, that isolates and removes the neuro-
chemical source of their addiction.
Nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) is themostwidespread form of
chemical treatment for addiction. In clinical trials, NRT produces a slight
but distinct advantage over people's quitting cold turkey. But, as to
maintaining abstinence, researchers at Harvard's Center for Global To-
bacco Control compared people who quit smoking either cold turkey,
or with NRT, three times at interims of two years each (Alpert et al.,
2012).
The study found no advantage in smoking cessation from using NRT.
Moreover, for themost dependent smokers, NRT use signiﬁcantly more
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doned their NRT regimen, and then quickly relapsed. Dr. Gregory N.
Connolly, director of Harvard's Center and co-author of the study, re-
gretted their discovery: “We were hoping for a very different story. I
ran a treatment program for years, and we invested millions in treat-
ment services” (Carey, 2012).
Whydid highly dependent smokers relapse so readily after receiving
NRT? The most important ingredients in quitting addictions are the
person's belief that they can, and their commitment to doing so. These
elements represent a basic life shift; they are inescapable aspects of
overcoming addiction in the long run. And these essential ingredients
to recovery cannot be injected or ingested in drug form. Instead, telling
yourself that you can't quit your addiction without the drug undercuts
the self-efﬁcacy required to achieve freedom from addiction. And, not
recognizing this truth, a massive, well-intentioned program produced
more negative outcomes, and presumably death.
This remarkable ﬁnding about addiction as experienced “in the
ﬂesh” won't impact those who espouse chemical remedies for addic-
tion, and who detest self-cure, just as their results had no effect on the
O′Brien team (which concluded: “Despite the results of this trial, phar-
macogenetics continues to hold promise as a way to improve the
targeting of medications to improve treatment response,” p. E6). Dr.
Richard Hurt, director of the Nicotine Dependence Center at the Mayo
Clinic, who was not involved in the Harvard study, said products like
nicotine gum and patches “are absolutely essential, but we use them
in combinations and doses that match treatment to what the individual
patient needs, unlike smokers who are self-treating.”
The Times itself continues to drumbeat chemical cures for smoking
in its Well column, including now in addition to NRT, Chantix. Mean-
while, in a workshop I led (March 3, 2016) at Adelphi University's
School of Social Work comprising 85 people, I asked how many had
quit smoking. Thirty to 35 people raised their hands. When I asked
how many used any form of medication in order to quit, one person
raised her hand.
I then asked another woman what had enabled her to quit. “I tried
for years, and I was sick with worry. I would go to bed at night, vowing
not to smoke in the morning, and then I picked it right up again.” This
story is identical to those told by smokers who ﬁnally quit smoking,
they say, due to Chantix, stories frequently advertised on television by
the drug's manufacturer. Only this woman's story, almost universally
typical for the smokers in my informal sample, a group unheard
from in the media, in which she ultimately quit on her own after a
tortuous journey, and didn't relapse, fundamentally contradicts the
advertisement.
4. What does this tell us about addiction, therapy and change?
4.1. Iatrogenic conceptions and treatment
What may be the most obvious result of our cultural conceptions
and therapeutic efforts in re addiction is our ability to create addiction
and to retard remission. I have cited the sharp increase in overdose
deaths (more accurately labeled drug-related-deaths, cf. Rudd et al.,
2016) and reported addiction (Brady et al., 2016; although the leap
from DRD to addiction is, by itself, speculative and tangential) concur-
rent with the ascendance of the brain disease movement (Peele,
2016). This backward trend is also evident in the U.S. government's sur-
vey of lifetime histories of drug and alcohol dependence, referred to as
NLAES and NESARC. Both NLAES and NESARC (which included waves
of surveying of subjects) have found natural remission to be the domi-
nant outcome category, including a majority of formerly-dependent
drinkers who now drink without problems (Peele, 2007)
While it isn't possible to compare the exact remission rates across
the decades between NLAES (1992, see Dawson, 1996), NESARC I
(2001–2002, see Dawson et al., 2005), and NESARC III (2012–2103,
see Grant et al., 2015), we detect that (a) Dawson et al. (2005) noteda decline in natural remission between NLAES and NESARC I, while (b)
Grant et al. (2015) found a 50% increase (!) in past-year AUDs, from
8.5% to 14% retaining the DSM-IV categorization of subjects, between
2001–02 and 2012–13.
4.2. Mindfulness, meaning the ability to separate oneself from one's
addicted state, is an essential therapeutic tool
What accounts for apparently simultaneously increasing painkiller
and heroin addiction rates in the early part of this century, along with
the sharp increase in measured alcohol use disorders? It is certainly
not a good sign for current conceptions of addiction and therapy for it,
but rather the reverse (Peele, 2015). In Recover! (Peele and
Thompson, 2015), I argue for therapy that (a) separates people's identi-
ties from their addictions bymaking clear the latter are changeable, and
(b) the use ofmindfulness, derived fromBuddhism, that presents cogni-
tive techniques that allow people to detach themselves from the ongo-
ing rush of their experience.
We issue a call in Recover!: "So, hear this: you are not a passive spec-
tator to your brain's functioning or an unfortunate victim of it. You are
the primary generator of how your brain functions—of how you
function—both in the here and now, and certainly over the long run."
And this is free will.
5. Conclusion
People regularly quit addictions, including often by cutting down
their consumption in the case of alcohol. Yet these phenomena—self-
cure and moderation—are little noted in the dominant neuroscientiﬁc
paradigm of addiction. Indeed, it may be impossible for this paradigm
to accommodate these phenomena, which dominate both our lived ex-
perience and epidemiological data (Peele, 2015).
To form a realistic, useful scientiﬁc and policy approach to addiction
we must instead recognize:
• Change in addictive behavior is usually self-initiated and self-
propelled—i.e., mindful.
• Convincing people that they are not able to control their behavior is
counterproductive.
• The dominant model of addiction, viewing people as passive victims,
fuels addiction.
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